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or
Book Review: Game Theory and the Humanities:
Bridging Two Worlds, by Steven J. Brams
Karl-Dieter Crisman
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Gordon College, Wenham, MA
karl.crisman@gordon.edu
Synopsis
This review discusses Brams’ wide-ranging book Game Theory and the Human-
ities and gives some basic examples of the methodology and style, including how
the Theory of Moves contributes to understanding such games.
Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging TwoWorlds.
By Steven J. Brams, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2012. (Hard-
cover US$35.00, ISBN: 9780262015226. Paperback US$18.00,
ISBN: 9780262518253. 336 pages.)
In writing a book review, the author needs to make a basic decision.
Should he take the easy route and start with a glorified table of contents,
or take some effort to find an attractive and relevant example to lure the
reader in? The reader, too, has to decide within a paragraph or two whether
to read what might be several dense pages ending in irrelevance—or perhaps
miss out on a really valuable and even informative resource.
In fact, one might set this scenario up as a non-zero-sum game between
two players: the Author and the Reader. For the purposes of this scenario,
let us assume that all reviews that start with a summary are boring, and ones
starting with a clever example are useful (but that the players don’t know
this). In that case, one might rank the results as in the matrix in Table 1,
(with 4 being best).
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Reader Sticks With It Reader Quits
Author Starts
with Example
(A 3, R 4) (A 1, R 2)
Author Starts
with Summary
(A 4, R 1) (A 2, R 3)
Table 1: The Book Review Game.
Clearly the author wants the review to be read; however, a secondary
motivation is definitely expending as little effort as possible. The reader, on
the other hand, wants to avoid ennui, but figures that missing out on a good
review is better than reading a bad one to the bitter end.1
The reader of this review has already figured out that this bears no re-
semblance to reality. But if Author and Reader are fictional characters, in a
similar-yet-not-the-same world in a novel, all at once doing some analysis of
what behaviors might be rational might make good sense—at the very least,
to an author exploring different scenarios, or to a critic.
That game theory of this variety might yield insight into literature, and
indeed into many of the humanities, is the premise of Steve Brams’ unique
book. Drawing from a wide array of disciplines (and bringing together in
one convenient place a number of his better-known, as well as more obscure,
analyses), Brams, a game theorist and a professor of politics in New York
University, brings games and equilibria to bear on everything from the law
and philosophy to the Hebrew Bible.
Some topics in the humanities, as one might expect, lend themselves well
to game-theoretic analysis. Two representative samples are Brams’ careful
analysis of Joseph Heller’s original Catch-22 in the eponymous novel and a
reconstruction of the possible games played in the Iran hostage crisis.2 Un-
surprisingly for a political scientist, there are chapters on the law, political
philosophy, fair division, and magnanimity after wars—all topics where one
can easily imagine two players whose motives and preferences can be analyzed
from the historical record.
1If you know a little game theory, note that there is only one Nash equilibrium, and
it’s not the ideal outcome. And if you do not, for the purposes of this review, a Nash
equilibrium is a pragmatically optimal solution to a problem, in the sense that the players,
aiming to optimize their own outcomes, will end up converging to such an outcome.
2Brams interprets the latter as history rather than political science.
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For instance, in the last category he tackles topics like the Franco-Prussian
and US Civil Wars. The analysis makes a good deal of sense, and (at least to
me) helps cut through the knot of entangled possible motives for postbellum
dealings. Much the same can be said of the other chapters. Using basic game
theory, one can start to explain behavior as rational (for instance, within the
setup of a novel) that otherwise might be hard to understand. This is a
key concept in the book; the goal is not to provide definitive conclusions
about (say) Macbeth, but to move toward recognition that difficult episodes
(whether real or fictional) might be less enigmatic than common wisdom
would suggest.
To entice the reader, I haven’t yet mentioned a number of more surprising
applications. Brams devotes two whole chapters to literary instances of game-
theoretic deduction, such as an analysis of rationality in Lysistrata. He has
taught seminars and written entire books concerning serious uses of game
theory in understanding superior beings3 and the God of the Old Testament
in particular; the summaries here of those larger writings are extremely useful
for moving beyond simplistic portrayals of these topics that ignore the human
experience surrounding them.
So what sort of analyses does Brams make of such varied situations? It’s
worth indulging in an extended example, so let us return to the original
Author-Reader story. You may not be convinced that this is a good literary
device; well, this author is no novelist. However, exactly the same game
matrix describes the game involved in the US President Richard Nixon’s
potential defiance of the Supreme Court in the matter of the Watergate
tapes.
In that case, the players were Nixon himself and two of his own appointees
to the Court. To summarize Brams’ argument, Burger and Blackmun voting
with the rest of the court to demand that Nixon hands over the tapes (against
what could have been their own jurisprudential leaning) was the Nash equi-
librium of this game. Without the potential for each player to threaten to
move to a different outcome, it is hard to see how the outcome could have
been otherwise between rational players (even if Nixon, with some foresight,
could have avoided the whole confrontation before the game started).
3Brams also tackles the question of how we might know if they exist; see Superior Be-
ings: If They Exist, How Would We Know? Game-Theoretic Implications of Omniscience,
Omnipotence, Immortality, and Incomprehensibility, Springer, New York, 1983/2007.
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So far so good. But Brams’ real contribution to this kind of study (and
the basis for much of the book) is his Theory of Moves (TOM). This is the
idea that in some games, one really can view the players as being able to
threaten to move from a Nash equilibrium (or other state) in order to try to
force a better outcome over many rounds of play. For instance, in the Book
Review Game between the Author and the Reader, if A moves from (2, 3) to
the (worse) (1, 1), R will definitely want to move to (3, 4).4 Note that each
player can only move within a row or a column, depending on which player
s/he is. Nonetheless, often this threat to move to a worse outcome (perhaps
for both) leads to a move by the other player of a similar type, and so forth.
The real consequence of TOM is that one can extrapolate from all starting
positions what moves might be made or threatened. Then both players can
see what outcomes are possible ending states and choose a Nonmyopic Equi-
librium state. In the Author-Reader/Court-Nixon game, this is the Pareto-
optimal (3, 4). To fully understand why, a careful reading of pages 61–63
(where this is introduced) is necessary.5 But the essence is that by predict-
ing threats and moves, each player will know where to stop threatening and
moving for a preferred outcome. In general games, these equilibria are not
always Pareto-optimal.6 Nonetheless, in my view, any theory that can give
a good way to get from a non-optimal Nash equilibrium to a Pareto-optimal
outcome is very much worth exploring!
Finally, a book review should also address briefly why the book might be
relevant to the readership of the particular outlet it is being aimed for. In the
context of this Journal, we might wonder. Even if game theory is a recognized
part of mathematics, the connection between the humanities and humanistic
might be somewhat up for grabs. After all, there is plenty of academic work
in disciplines such as classics or history which is not really humanistic, or at
least not in my estimation. Textual criticism and archival analysis are both
valuable, but they do not always address human motivation.
4In fact, many of the analyses take into account that one party must move first, such
as the Court in this case, yielding a 2× 4 payoff matrix.
5The short version is that Author knows Reader would prefer to stay at the Nash
equilibrium than switch to (4, 1); so Author will choose not to exercise the move from
(3, 4) to (4, 1), but Reader prefers (3, 4) to (1, 2), and will also then choose not to move
from (3, 4).
6In the 2× 2 case there is only one half-exception.
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Brams manages to convince his reader that we can gain deeper insight
into what motivates us as humans by thinking about these questions. I think
that the most intriguing of these examples is the story of the Akedah, which
motivates Kierkegaard’s famous reflection Fear and Trembling. This is the
story of the Biblical patriarch Abraham, and his choice whether to obey God
and sacrifice his son and heir Isaac (or, in the Islamic tradition, Ishmael).
Few choices could be more fraught with consequence, and Brams gives several
different possible game-theoretic interpretations addressing different possible
motivations for both Abraham and God. For those unsure on the one hand
about whether God could be treated as having motivation, or on the other
about whether God exists, I encourage one to read Brams’ treatment first,
which I think will convince one of the appropriateness and utility of exam-
ining such stories through this lens, even given such uncertainty.
A couple caveats. First, although presented in more friendly fashion and
not going in as much depth as the source papers and books, this is still very
much a research-type text which would be hard to use for course adoption at
most colleges. It is more accessible because of the relatively simplicity of the
mathematics, but the arguments are still deep, and the reader who is truly
an expert in all the topics in the humanities addressed will be hard to find.
Second, those who are experts in such topics may or may not agree with the
arguments presented herein, or even find them trivial or too complex. That’s
okay; as Brams says in another book, such readers are invited to derive their
own conclusions from different starting points—the point is that the method
may illuminate, not any specific conclusions.
So in sum, I find this text to be indispensable for any course that teaches
game theory, as a source of provocative and wide-ranging examples.7 And
it’s a worthy addition to the library of anyone who cares about either human
choices, or how to bring mathematics beyond the sciences.
Postscript: An extensive review by the same author focusing more on the theistic and
Biblical aspects of several of Brams’ books will soon be published in the Journal of the
Association of Christians in the Mathematical Sciences.
7Indeed, one of my students based a good paper on coming up with his own game
matrix for the Akedah. I can see a lot of promise for student projects or even publications
coming from the ideas in this book.
